Productivity postponed by Vanessa Sumo
A
lmost every company has a
story to tell about how the
power of information tech-
nology, or IT, has transformed its
business. Dell, the world’s largest 
personal computer manufacturer,
takes orders directly from customers
via the Internet, builds computers
exactly to their specifications, and
ships, all within 24 hours. Wal-Mart’s
Retail Link system shares actual sales,
forecasts, and inventory data from its
6,200 stores with 30,000 suppliers
worldwide, which allows the company
to respond effectively to customer
demand and minimize inventory costs.
On-board computers enable dispatch-
ers and truck drivers to communicate,
and thus make decisions that keep big
rigs fully loaded and on the road.
An improvement in productivity, or
the ability to produce more goods and
services for the same amount of effort,
generates higher profits for the com-
pany and its owners and wages for its
workers, and therefore a better stan-
dard of living over time. Technological
progress is key to productivity growth
because it offers a better way of doing
things, of pushing out an economy’s
frontier of production possibilities.
Sometimes this progress is subtle —
for instance, when marginal improve-
ments are made to existing
technologies — while in other cases, it
is stark. History counts several exam-
ples of major innovations. The steam
engine, electricity, and the internal
combustion engine are just some of
the creations that have raised living
standards over the centuries.
Similarly, many believe that the
advancements in IT, triggered by the
invention of the microchip, have ush-
ered in a period of fast productivity
growth in America. “Technological
innovation, and in particular the
spread of information technology, has
revolutionized the conduct of business
over the past decade and resulted in
rising rates of productivity growth,”
remarked former Federal Reserve
Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan in
December 2000. Average labor pro-
ductivity, or the amount of output
produced for each hour worked, grew
by 2.6 percent a year for the nonfarm
business sector between 1995 and
2004, double the pace between 1973
and 1995, according to data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Labor productivity depends partly
on the amount of capital each worker
is equipped with — the more
machines per worker, the higher his
productivity. But labor productivity
also depends on something called
“total factor productivity,” or TFP, a
term which measures the growth in
output that is not due to changes in
either capital or labor. TFP is usually
associated with technological change
because it tries to capture the efficiency
with which labor and capital inputs are
used. For instance, TFProse by 1.3 per-
cent per year from 1995 to 2004,
accounting for half of the overall
growth in labor productivity. And like
the growth in labor productivity, TFP
has increased much faster than in the
two previous decades.
But it was not always so evident that
ITcould be a driving force for produc-
tivity growth. A period of weak
productivity gains in the two decades
to the mid-1990s spurred many econo-
mists, including Andreas Hornstein of
the Richmond Fed and Per Krusell of
Princeton University (and also a
Richmond Fed visiting scholar) to
attempt to explain this period. They
find that after rising by 1.9 percent a
year from 1954 to 1973, labor produc-
tivity actually reversed to -0.2 percent a
year from 1973 to 1979 before recover-
ing to positive territory of 1.1 percent a
year from 1979 to 1993 (although still
trailing the pre-1973 pace). 
Changes in TFP were similar. This
was puzzling in the wake of widespread
introduction of robotics and micro-
processor technologies. Why hadn’t
these innovations boosted produc-
tivity? One could not blame Nobel
laureate economist Robert Solow when
he famously observed in 1987, “You can




The late 20th century witnessed huge leaps in information technology 
innovation, but gains in productivity were slow to follow. Economists, 
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Perhaps a good way to understand this
productivity paradox is to reach even
further back in history. The invention
of the dynamo (the electrical genera-
tor) and the course of electrification
that followed beginning in 1880 had
promised profound transformations
to every factory, store, and home. But
the realization of such a vision was
hardly imminent at the turn of the
20th century, according to Stanford
University economist Paul David. 
Aside from the slow pace of electri-
fication and the durability of the old
manufacturing “group drive” system of
power transmission, machines had to
be fitted with electric motors (which
meant that old machines and new ones
operated alongside one another), fac-
tory structures had to be radically
redesigned, and the stock of factory
architects, electrical engineers, and
workers familiar with the new
machines needed to be built up. This
protracted adjustment made gains in
productivity slow to come.
Similarly in the 1970s, computer
technology did not manifest itself
immediately in a revolutionary way,
and maybe this isn’t surprising. Some
research shows that the transition to 
a new technological regime can 
actually slow productivity growth as
firms take time to learn how to use the
new technology. This period of 
“learning-by-doing” is one of the more
intriguing explanations, proposed by
Hornstein and Krusell, for the slow-
down of measured TFP growth during
the two decades to the 
mid-1990s. 
“The idea is that new
machines require an invest-
ment in learning that is not
measured. Since a rise in
unmeasured investment
spending leads to an under-
estimated output growth,
measured TFP growth is
lower,” explains Hornstein.
“Another way of looking at it
is that if we assign the same
experience level across all
equipment, including the
new ones, then we will tend
to overestimate the contribution of the
new capital equipment to output
growth, hence underestimating observ-
able productivity growth.”
This problem arises if new tech-
nologies embodied in the latest
equipment are introduced at a rapid
pace, forcing workers to learn faster
on the job. The 1970s offers a neat
example. Faster and better computers
flooded the market every year, such
that the quality-adjusted price of 
their components (processor speed, 
memory, etc.) dropped dramatically.
Hornstein and Krusell find that prior
to 1973, the price of producers’
durable equipment was falling by 2.9
percent a year, whereas after 1973 it
was falling by an additional 0.6 per-
centage point per year. The cheaper
prices encouraged firms to accumu-
late more and more ITcapital.
But in a world where a new
machine cannot simply be plugged
and played, the adoption of a new
technology can temporarily reduce a
worker’s productivity simply because
the effective use of the new equip-
ment is initially overestimated. The
evidence suggests this is what hap-
pened in the 1970s. As the pace of
capital-embodied technical change
quickens, TFP growth will initially be
lower because only a fraction of the
new equipment is actually operable.
Firms need time to learn how to best
integrate the new technology in their
production plans and workers need to
update their skills. As this adjustment
moves forward, the process of learn-
ing-by-doing will bring in additional
productivity gains.
Other studies have treaded along
similar lines as those of Hornstein and
Krusell; that is, the idea that there is
some delay in reaping the benefits of
investments in IT. Economists
Susanto Basu of Boston College, John
Fernald of the San Francisco Fed,
Nicholas Oulton of the London
School of Economics, and Sylaja
Srinivasan of the Bank of England find
that in order to benefit from IT, there
must be “substantial investments in
learning, reorganization, and the like,
so that the payoff in terms of meas-
ured output may be long delayed.” 
This study follows naturally from
where Hornstein and Krusell left off.
Although TFP growth is initially
underestimated because such invest-
ments are not measured, it is 
actually overestimated once these
complementary investments become
an increasingly important part of the
production process. Indeed, the
authors find that the surge in meas-
ured TFP growth in the late 1990s in
the United States is positively correlated
with high IT capital growth rates in
the 1980s or early 1990s, but negatively
correlated with the growth rate of IT
investment in the same period.
These investments are in intangible
assets such as new organizational
designs, worker knowledge, and moni-
toring and incentive systems. Although
intangible, these assets are not invisible
and so would likely show up in the mar-
ket’s estimation of a firm’s value. No
wonder that when Johnson
& Johnson finally discov-
ered its winning formula
for combining computer-
based flexible machinery
with a carefully designed
work plan for manufactur-
ing adhesive bandages, it
ordered its factory win-
dows painted black to
prevent competitors from
running away with its valu-
able blueprint.
Measured productivity
growth can also understate
actual improvements in


































The use of personal computers became widespread in the 1980s, but may
have done little to boost workers’ productivity until years later.
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and Krusell, if the quality component
of a final good or service is very high.
For instance, simply comparing the
number of cars produced today to 20
years ago does not reflect the signifi-
cant quality changes that a typical car
has undergone. It would be more
appropriate to adjust a good or service
for its quality content, but that is often
difficult to do. 
In addition, this understatement is
exacerbated the more capital-inten-
sive the production of the quality
component of output is relative to
quantity. Computers, for example, are
a big part of how banks are able to
offer customers increasingly conven-
ient ways of transacting. In that case, a
large portion of the increase in the
capital stock actually reduces TFP
growth because the output growth
that it generates goes unmeasured.
Hence, measured improvements in
TFP can slow during a period of rapid
technological change because IT capi-
tal goods are factored into the
equation — but the quality and con-
venience of these new services eludes
output statistics.
The late economist Zvi Griliches
emphasized the consequences of poor
measurement for the “unmeasurable
sectors” of the economy, mostly the
services industries. He showed that
despite heavy investments made in
computers and other information-
processing equipment, more than
three-quarters of this investment went
into the unmeasurable sectors, thus 
its productivity effects were largely
invisible in the data. 
To make matters worse, the struc-
ture of the economy has changed
significantly whereas data improve-
ments have come slowly. The share of
the services sector in total output, for
instance, has increased substantially
over the past half-century, weighing in
today at about three-quarters of GDP.
The services sector is singled out 
by Hornstein and Krusell, as well as 
others, as the most problematic in this
respect, because innovations from
these industries are trickier to identify
than the new products that come from
the goods sector. Until a few years ago,
bank output was measured by extrapo-
lating from the number of bank
employees, which surely would not
capture the convenience and time-
saving benefits from the rise of ATM
networks. 
Much has changed, however.
Because of new and improved ways of
measuring services output in the U.S.
industry data, recent estimates by
economists Jack Triplett and Barry
Bosworth of the Brookings Institution
were able to uncover the robust
growth in productivity that had 
always been there after all. Using the
new data, they find that the services
sector no longer lagged behind the
goods industries in terms of produc-
tivity growth. Labor productivity in
services increased by 2.6 percent a year
between 1995 and 2001, outpacing the
2.3 percent a year improvement in
labor productivity in the goods sector.  
Still, unlike Hornstein and Krusell,
Triplett does not believe that measure-
ment errors are the reason for the
slowdown in productivity growth 
during the 1970s and 1980s. “That’s
still a big puzzle,” says Triplett. “I 
suspect that it was a lot of different
things like the oil shock, regulation,
baby boomers entering labor force.”
Each of those may have had a small
effect, but taken together, the result
was significant.
Another view of the productivity
slowdown offered by Northwestern
University economist Robert Gordon,
in a comment to Hornstein and
Krusell’s paper, is that the slowdown
in productivity growth may be partly
due to the “new economy” of IT
simply falling short of some of the
remarkable inventions of the past. 
It just did not have the potential to
spur a massive acceleration in TFP.
“The one big wave of American eco-
nomic growth during 1915 to 1965,”
writes Gordon, “reflects the combined 
influence of several central inventions
that, taken together, had a much more
profound impact on the way the 
economy and society operated than
has the electronic computer.” 
The Revival
After a long dismal period in the two
decades to 1995, productivity growth
began to surge to heights that would
be expected of an economy booming
with IT-stimulated innovations and
investments. Dale Jorgenson and Mun
Ho of Harvard University and New
York Fed economist Kevin Stiroh find
that average labor productivity grew
by 2.64 percent a year over the period
1995 to 2004 compared with 1.39 per-
cent from 1973 to 1995, representing a
gain of 1.25 percent a year. Of this 
difference, 0.62 percent a year was due
to capital deepening (the increase in
the amount of equipment used per
worker) and 0.72 percent was due to
faster TFP growth. 
The remarkable contribution of
technological progress in IT produc-
tion is reflected in the 30 percent 
share of the IT-producing sector to the
increase in TFP growth over the two
periods, contributing far more than 
the 3.9 percent share of IT equipment
and software in aggregate output. This
impressive productivity performance
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Labor Productivity and Total Factor
Productivity Growth
Despite the growing use of computers, productivity
growth slowed between 1973 and 1995 but finally
















NOTES: Labor productivity growth is the average annual percent-
age change in output per hour for workers in the nonfarm
business sector. The growth in labor productivity partly depends
on total factor productivity growth, which is the average annual
percentage change in output that is not accounted for by
changes in either capital or labor. Average annual growth rates
are computed using a geometric average.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Labor Productivity
Total Factor Productivity
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fall in ITprices and thus in boosting IT
investment. This has led to the wide
diffusion of IT capital across all sec-
tors, reflected in the two-thirds share
of capital deepening attributed to IT. 
But one thorny issue is whether
these gains have actually spilled 
over to industries outside of the IT-
producing sector. The services sector
comes to mind since these industries
are heavy users of ITcapital, but some
also believe they have been afflicted
with “Baumol’s Disease” — a theory
developed by New York University
economist William Baumol which sup-
poses that the inherent nature of
services causes them to languish in
terms of productivity improvements. 
Triplett and Bosworth, who were
among the first to look at productivity
growth in the services sector, discover
evidence to the contrary. They find that
most of the acceleration in labor pro-
ductivity growth after 1995, and all of
the acceleration in TFP growth, took
place in the services industries. This
lays to rest previous assertions that the
productivity growth of the 1990s was
fragile because no improvements in
productivity, particularly TFP, occurred
outside the electronics manufacturing
sector. Moreover, they find that four-
fifths of the total contribution of ITto
aggregate labor productivity growth
between 1995 and 2001 is thanks to the
services industries.
Strong productivity growth contin-
ued after the late 1990s, even beyond
the end of the 1991 to 2000 expansion.
This has led to the consensus that the
resurgence was not cyclical, that it
would not fade away even as output
growth slowed down. Rather, it repre-
sents something more sustainable,
suggesting that the American econo-
my could continue to expand, raising
standards of living.
Will this strong productivity 
growth continue? “It depends on what
the innovations are going to be and in
what ways we can expand the variety of
products in an economy,” Hornstein
says. “I think there is still some poten-
tial there, for the application of IT and 
for productivity growth.” Jorgenson,
Ho, and Stiroh anchor their projections
critically on factors such as the 
evolution of semiconductor technology
and business investment patterns.
Nevertheless, they find “little evidence
to suggest that the technology-led pro-
ductivity resurgence is over or that the
U.S. economy will revert to the slower
pace of productivity growth of the
1970s and 1980s.” 
Gordon likewise predicts that pro-
ductivity growth rates will stay firm,
similar to the growth rate of the late
’90s, but doubts that IT will be the
main driving force. “I tend to think we
have now exploited the low-hanging
fruit of the Internet revolution,” says
Gordon. Electricity and the internal
combustion engine were mega-inven-
tions, in terms of their direct effects
and the importance of their spin-offs
and complements. On the other hand,
he considers the semiconductor, com-
puter chip, and digitalization merely 
“first-rate” inventions that likewise
spawned other first-rate inventions,
particularly the Internet. Beyond that,
he sees only a slew of second-rate inno-
vations, a string of bit-by-bit technical
improvements instead of the revolution
that we enjoyed during the last decade.
Alook back shows that IThas had
a profound impact on productivity
growth, even during periods when this
bond may not have seemed so strong.
But there is less of a consensus about
the role of ITin propelling productiv-
ity growth in the future, in part
because some puzzles still remain.
One lingering question is why IT did
not spur a similar productivity revival
in Europe when, after all, a computer
is the same anywhere in the world.
The tumultuous affair between tech-
nology and productivity looks certain
to continue. RF
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